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This article is based on the process of prototyping an environmental enrichment
device for gibbons at the National Zoo of Chile (ZNdC). We analyse the capacity of
prototyping to make the ontological qualities of the entities involved perceptible while
precipitating forms of care and connection. We will show that the very process of
prototyping favours the mise en scène of an interspecies environment, sheltering the
delicate unfolding of an ‘us’ that is based on mutual care and attention. We argue that
this unfolding transforms prototyping into a cosmopolitical place for exercising modes
of correspondence between humans, non-humans and environments. In an effort to
understand prototyping as a scenario in which to perform our species
interdependence, we propose a conversation between different concepts around the
ideas of cosmopolitics and correspondence in order to encourage reflections on
design practices that are sensitive to those entangled ʽbeyond the human.ʼ
prototyping, species interdependence, cosmopolitics, care, correspondence

1

Introduction

The current ecological crisis and perception of ontological uncertainty, have generated renewed
interest in studying the multiple modes of existence that compose our 'collective' as well as the
continuities or discontinuities established between humans and non-humans (Descola, 2005;
Haraway, 2008; Ingold, 1988; Latour, 2007; Stengers, 2010). This concern, which is generally
described as an 'ontological turn,' has generated a busy agenda in both theoretical and
methodological terms that is aimed at rethinking the analytical repertoires necessary to incorporate
the non-expected agency of more-than-human entities into analyses of our social worlds.
Concepts such as cosmopolitics (Stengers, 1997, 2005, 2010, 2013), the parliament of things (Latour,
2005), hybrid assemblages (Callon, 2008; Callon & Rip, 1992; Lestel, 2004), correspondence (Ingold,
2017), companion species (Haraway, 2008), precariousness (Butler 2016) and multi-species
ethnography (Kirksey & Helmreich, 2010; Kohn, 2007) reflect just some of the efforts that have been
made to move beyond the modern anthropocentrism that has prevailed in social research.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike
4.0 International License.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/

In spite of the importance of the ecological considerations posed by what is called the ‘ontological
turn’, we find few works focused on the epistemological challenges imposed by ontological
multiplicity on design practices (Binder, Brandt, Ehn, & Halse, 2015; Jönsson & Lenskjold, 2014,
2017). Efforts in this area share a desire to explore experimental tools for extending the condition of
subjects to non-human entities (Binder et al., 2015) or to understanding how non-human entities
participate in the design process (Rice, 2017).
Our contribution to this discussion is based on the process of designing and prototyping an
environmental enrichment device for gibbons at the National Zoo of Chile (ZNdC) in the context of
the Interaction Design Workshop offered by the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile School of
Design (TDI-UC). We argue that given the challenges that this ontological turn “beyond the human”
poses, design must challenge the prevailing anthropocentrism present in its own modes of
producing knowledge and materializing it. We believe that by distancing ourselves from dualist
anthropocentrism (Bennett, 2010), we approach more careful, situated forms of conceiving of the
project. As Bennet suggests, “the ethical task is to cultivate ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to
become open to it” (2010:14).
In this regard, this article describes the qualities of the prototyping process in terms of allowing for
an ethics of care between agencies that interact. Specifically, we analyse a design process that
weaves together animals, students, zookeepers, docents and environments. While the case study
will be conducted using different conceptual figures, we propose a conversation between two main
concepts: cosmopolitics (Stengers, 2005; Latour, 2007) and correspondence (Ingold, 2017).
As we have discussed in earlier studies (Hermansen and Tironi, 2018; Tironi and Hermansen, 2018;
Tironi, Hermansen and Neira, 2014), the cosmopolitical purpose of producing a notion of politics
that is permeable to more than human affectivity is a practical challenge which cannot be confined
to the philosophical domain. In other words, cosmopolitics can also be conceived of as a matter of
design, understood as a space of experimentation for ways of articulating the multiple, and 'drawing
things together' (Binder et al., 2015; Li Jönsson, 2014). As such, prototyping and designing with nonhuman entities allows us to glimpse spaces of correspondence in which beings respond to one
another in a gesture of care and attentionality rather than intentionality (Ingold, 2017).
This article demonstrates the ability of prototyping to slow down (Stengers, 2010) the assumptions
of user-centred and problem-solving design, opening up design to ever-emerging, precarious forms
of action in which to play. Following Donna Haraway, interspecies prototyping becomes a “worlding
game (...) of response and respect” (Haraway, 2008, p. 19). We offer an empirical analysis of how the
identities and positions evoked in the process of prototyping are no longer conceived of as given
facts to be assumed as the result of the processes of friction and care, ambiguity and
correspondence.

2

Cosmopolitical uncertainty

While cosmopolitanism postulates an exercise of world politics that is positive, normative and
controlled by humans of a certain profile, Stengers’ cosmopolitics (2005) stands at the antipodes of
this approach: it resists matters of fact and good reasons, questions laws and hegemonic consensus.
Going beyond diversity, it celebrates the incommensurability and recalcitrance of the multiple
ontologies that inhabit the world. Unlike the Habermasian public sphere (1991), a figure inherited
from cosmopolitanism in which the protagonist is a lettered, humanist and rational citizen, ready to
build consensus through dialogical practice, what prevails in the cosmopolitical meshwork are the
disputes, the possibilities of dissent and agonism. In the words of Stengers, in cosmopolitics, the
protagonist is "Deleuze's idiot, borrowed from Dostoevsky and turned into a conceptual character, is
the one who always slows the others down, who resists the consensual way in which the situation is
presented and in which emergencies mobilize thought or action” (Stengers, 2005, p. 994).
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The turn from the enlightened humanist to the cosmopolitical idiot is a radical one. Specifically, it
entails "making a move against the current that leads to the loss of self, which Sloterdijk calls 'revolutionary,' Plato, ‘periagogé,’ St. Augustine, ‘conversio’ and Heidegger, ‘Kehre,’ a movement
whose meaning is to direct itself, through it, towards the truth of being" (Cordua, 2008, p. 72). The
turn towards the idiotic, which we could paraphrase as the truth of being-here, is for Stengers
constitutive of the cosmopolitical experience, committing and encouraging us to exercise idiocy and
to incorporate the idiotic manifestations of others.
The importance of the idiot in times of ecological crisis is that he refuses to understand good reasons
or to be persuaded by the agreements that underlie the daily practices that have led us to the doors
of the debacle (Stengers 2005). To refuse is a "move against the current," a form of resistance that,
without arguments or agendas, forces those around the idiot to modify their forms of exchange and
socialization, deploying what Tsing calls the art of noticing (2011). The idiot has no hidden interests
or good reasons to resist. He is not claiming a cause or attempting to antagonise another. Without
heroism, from his truth of being-here, he imposes his inertia through the weight of his recalcitrance,
managing to slow down the course of things.
When we find that multiplicity and incommensurability is a common condition of the world, it
becomes necessary to challenge anthropocentric and patriarchal approaches to apprehend the
world, describing the ways in which non-human beings are affecting others and being affected by
them. The cosmopolitical exercise thus invites us to conceive of concrete spaces in which entities
such as mammals, volcanoes, software or microbes can exercise new forms of 'citizenship.' This
cosmopolitical interpelation compels us to participate in incommensurable worlds, to recognize the
frictions and precarities of the entities at play (De la Cadena, 2015). It not only rejects the
Habermasian consensus, but also is a call to carefully consider the heterogeneity of the cosmos1 and
the affective forms of more-than-human correspondence. Following Ingod (2016), correspondence
does not imply ontological symmetry, homogeneity or unification, but rather sympathy and
attentiveness, a recognition of the irreducible, in short, a sensitive attitude. It is in this sense that we
believe that Tim Ingold's notion of correspondence (2016) -as the meaningfully capacity of attending
and responding to the trajectories of all entities (2016:22) or the capacity of being affected and
being able to affect (Despret, 2004:114)- connects with the cosmopolitical invitation to recognize
that our social worlds cannot be reduced to the consensus "between humans." The notion of
correspondence thus shares one of the main cosmopolitical concerns, namely, carefully considering
the doubts, resistance and questions presented by more than human entities.

3

Prototyping modes of correspondence

How can we represent the beings bound in correspondence? How can we learn to generate knowledge
through mutual caring that is sensitive to differences and open to failures and precariousness? What
role could design play in this set of entanglements and correspondences?
Contrary to the grandiloquence of concepts such as “construction” or “fabrication” typical of the
“Promethean” logic of modernity, Bruno Latour (2008) postulates that design contains a gesture of
humility, an ethics of care and attention to the specific. This feature is intimately linked to the role of
the craftsman mentioned by Ingold (2013) and its ability to be affected by the vitality of things
rather than by the deductivism of abstract knowledge production. It is precisely this ethos which
finds itself positioned against the idea of the foundational progress of modern rationality, which
leads Latour (2008) to speak of design as a “post-Promethean moment of action.”
As a place of permanent redesign – or permanent becoming-with – prototyping radicalizes this ethos
of care in its operation because it never starts from a tabula rasa, never creates ex-nihilo: its opening
is based on a permanent calling to failure and redesign of that which already exists. This way of
being (fragile and porous) transforms the prototyping process into a privileged place for thinking
1

For Stengers, “cosmos refers to the unknown constituted by these multiple, divergent worlds and to the articulation of
which they would eventually be capable” (Stengers 2005:995).
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with care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017; Calvillo & Mesa del Castillo, 2018), creating entanglement with
entities beyond the human. In this regard, anthropologist Alberto Corsín Jiménez (2014) notes that
prototyping is a mode of action that is permeable to the intervention of non-experts whose action
favours a counter-hegemonic "epistemic culture" strengthened by collaboration, fluidity and
recycling (Corsín Jiménez, 2014). Complementing this argument, DiSalvo (2014) recognizes the
potential to detonate renewed practices of research and political action by means of critical making
as a distinctive quality of prototyping (Bjørgvinsson et al., 2012; Michael, 2012). For Mike Michael
(2012), the emergence of these new forms of research is related to the cyclical nature of prototyping
and its ability to accommodate idiotic misbehaviour, generating new ways of inventing and
understanding the social (Wilkie, Savransky & Rosengarten, 2017).
We argue that the main strengths of prototyping are its material fragility and its capacity for
attentiveness: through its successive failures, it manages to make available events and inventive
situations. Like accidents, the prototype places us in the presence of certain eventualities that
escape attempts to engage in prediction and scalability. Its malleability and vulnerability allow for
the deployment of careful ways of addressing the entities involved in its transformation. In other
words, it forces us to pay critical attention to the specificity of other species and their lifeworlds. In
contrast to the modern notion of the laboratory experiment2, prototyping captures and mobilises
the fragility and indetermination of its own action and releases the identity of the beings it summons
(Tironi & Hermansen, 2018).
Thus, we propose that prototyping offers us a privileged opportunity to rethink the atmospheres of
cosmopolitics through correspondence. Prototyping refrains from engaging in pretensions of
universality and instead claims procedural and situated action, allowing us to imagine and
materialise “species interdependence” (Haraway, 2008), becoming a way to ‘individuate the
problem’ (Lury, forthcoming)3 of more-than-human entanglements.

4

Case study: From problem-solving to attentiveness

In the methodological framework of the TDI-UC, the students had to develop their design project
under the precepts of problem-solving and user-centred design. The exercise involved an
ethnographically-inspired method of observation and recording that entails the knowing of the
future users of the environmental enrichment device by means of a description that stabilises their
needs and qualities. Articulating their non-participating observations with a review of ethological
documents on gibbons, the students’ aim was to observe the behaviours, routines, interactions and
difficulties experienced by animals in their daily lives. Based on this research, the students had to
develop a survey of the ‘ecology’ of the zoo which included interviews with the zookeepers,
scientists and visitors; observation of their information systems, and consideration of the climate,
vegetation, infrastructure and equipment.
In order to initiate a prototyping process using this approach, the students had to identify and
formulate a “design opportunity”. This logic is currently used in the methodology of Design Thinking,
client-oriented-design and the world of innovation in general (Kelley, 2007; Martin, 2009). The link
between opportunity and value creation emphasises a process of 'need finding' under the
assumption that the design opportunity will emerge from an operation oriented towards extracting
the problems experienced by users as highly defined entities. Therefore, formulating a design
opportunity forces designers to enter the prototyping phase with hypotheses or questions that are
clear and empirically verifiable. This allows us to iteratively and experimentally refine the response
to the opportunity through a series of functional prototypes whose purpose and meaning is to arrive
at a final product, the resolution of a given problem. This logic also seeks to minimise ignorance and
uncertainty about the scope of intervention if the recipients are deficient subjects on behalf of
2

For more information on this point, see Despret, 2008
For Celia Lury, the “individuation of a problematic” is a process of activating the present (and not just an abstract matter),
a material accomplishment of the doing of a method, composed of a set of components.
3

475

whom the experts will design a solution. Finally, in this paradigm the prototype makes sense if it
serves to solve some of the problems identified in the user and thus increase the efficiency of an
original future. Each prototype is a temporary means for testing certain qualities of a product that
will only be real once it is inserted into the market.
It is precisely this principle of the “design opportunity” which was subverted by the group of
students in charge of designing, producing and implementing a device to enrich the gibbon’s
environment through their prototyping process. Though the group of designers (which called
themselves the Gibonas) successfully completed the observation and identification of certain
problems of the recipients (a group of four gibbons: a couple, their daughter and grandchild), they
found that their preliminary exploration did not give them enough information to be certain about
the profiles of the four gibbons and the critical interactions that the research question for the first
prototype should sustain. While the docent team sought to encourage the students to identify the
problem and develop intentionality around their response to it as a design opportunity, the Gibonas
chose the unexpected option of using the first prototype mainly as a means to explore and record
the gibbons' spontaneous behaviour, not as a way to define a future product. The Gibonas thus
described their first prototype as “a network of jute cords placed in a random and basic manner”
(Gibonas, 2016).

Figure 1: General view of the first prototype (Gibonas, 2016).

This situation led to a controversy that included the team of docents and the students as well as the
zookeepers and the gibbons themselves, evoking two sensibilities or ways of approaching the
project. Following Ingold (2013), these can be described through the figures of the theoretician and
the artisan in a scenario in which the former “makes through thinking and the other thinks through
making” (Ingold, 2013, p. 6).
The TDI-UC docents argued in favour of design through thinking, that is, projecting a material
response, in this case a prototype, based on a research question. This approach assigns the capacity
to mediate and translate interests and knowledge to the prototype as an object. By contrast, the
Gibonas tacitly adopted a thinking through making (Ingold, 2013) approach.
Through this becoming-with (with the gibbons, the zookeepers, the materialities of the prototype
and the enclosure), the Gibonas entered the prototyping process with a move that went against the
hegemonic methodological canon, a canon that the docent team had adopted in collaboration with
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the ZNdC scientists. Articulating a practical alliance with the zookeepers –those who directly work
with the animals and ensures that the prototypes meet safety and building standards-, the students
avoided associating their first prototype with a concise question, operationalising their imperfect
knowledge of the gibbon family. Because they lacked specific objectives that would allow them to
validate the success or failure of their prototype, the Gibonas transformed this first prototyping
experience into a malleable territory in which to materialise their uncertainties and observe the
gibbons’ preferences.
We could say that the Gibonas allowed themselves to be guided by the “idiot’s murmur” (Stengers,
2005, 2010), that is, by radical uncertainties regarding the solutions that they were to provide.
Stengers uses this conceptual figure –which Deleuze and Guattari (1994) take from Dostoevsky- to
describe how we should exercise and address scepticism regarding anthropocentric forms of
thinking about the collective without prerequisites on a cosmopolitical horizon. The Gibonas did not
mean to arrive at a result, but to turn the meaningless into a creative and generative prototyping
process that is constituted from dissent. This idiotic reticence does not come from a perfectly
thought-out reason or the suspicion that the statu-quo could be imperfect. The idiot simply believes
that, perhaps, “there is something more important” though incomprehensible that goes beyond the
way in which the situation is presented (Stengers, 2005, p. 994).
Through their first intervention, the Gibonas approached the ecology composed of primates,
docents, zookeepers, environments and scientists without seeking to impose an alternative
theoretical framework, performing situated and affective knowledge motivated more by a sort of
empathy with the gibbons than analytical reasoning. This situated way of knowing and being with
others entails a move away from intentional rationality, a move that unfolds different gradients of
attentiveness and correspondence. Following Haraway (2008), the Gibonas’ performance meant “to
hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have courteous
regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite greeting, to constituting the polis, where and when
species meet. To knot companion and species together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to
enter the world of becoming with, where who and what are is precisely what is at stake.” (Haraway,
2008, p. 19)
When asked about their “idiotic” behaviour in the design and implementation of the prototype, they
answered that their priority was to centre the prototyping process: “We think it is hasty to try to test
a solution before having an initial encounter with the gibbon family. We know that we are not
following the instructions, but we decided to follow our instincts and see what would happen with
the simple installation of loosely tied together jute ropes, taking steps to ensure that we did not put
the gibbons at risk.” (Gibonas, 2016)
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Figure 2: General view of the first prototype in use (Gibonas, 2016).

4.1

Who are we designing for?

The implementation of the first prototype in the gibbons’ enclosure, which was conceived of as a
malleable platform in which the family of primates could performatively express their preferences,
encouraged the docent team to rethink the role of the designers as problem solvers and the gibbons
as users. The idiotic behaviours that marked the first prototyping cycle opened up the project in
unanticipated directions, slowing down the rhythm of the design process. When analysing the first
intervention, the group described their findings as follows: “We don’t know for whom we are
designing if we don’t consider the gibbons’ reactions to our interventions” (Gibonas, 2016). When
testing a prototype under a problem-solving framework, the analysis of user reactions is an
imperative for product optimisation, but prototyping took on a different dynamic during this
experience. The gibbons’ reactions to the prototype could not be taken as inputs for improving or
perfecting the original solution because, as we have seen, the first prototype eluded the
operationalisation of a hypothesis.
Figure 2, which was captured after the implementation of the first prototype, shows how the
gibbons surprised the designers and zookeepers by moving beyond the area provided for
spontaneous use by sitting on the anchors that connect the net to the enclosure to observe the
recently installed structure. Though this intervention was conceived of as a space that could be
interpreted and did not provide a specific layout, the gibbons managed to find a space of subversion,
using that which was apparently undesirable to stand on. This encounter seems to corroborate the
idea that the encounter between agencies brings about unpredictable consequences and may
surprisingly reveal hidden qualities of the entities involved.
The prototyping process becomes an opportunity to probe frictions and speculate about the
enactment of an interspecies world. It forces us to think “in the presence of” (Stengers, 2005) that
which we had left aside. The manifestation of this previously hidden subject brings to light the
unanticipated consequences of our forgetting, pushing us to abandon the illusion that we will be
able to predict how relationships between the parties involved in a certain ecology will develop.
Nonetheless, the unexpected development of this prototyping precipitated an original experience of
co-existence.
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As a result, the gibbons’ reactions could not be translated and incorporated into a preconceived
model. Instead, they had to be interpreted as emergent data. The uses of the web were unique
based on the skills, preferences and developmental stage of each of the four gibbons. Certain
characteristics that had not been recognised in earlier observations emerged following the
introduction of the prototype into the gibbon’ enclosure:
The first prototype showed us things that we hadn’t seen before. Sanuk used the tensest
areas of the web almost exclusively. Kayak was always looking for spaces to interact with
the ropes. Kena seemed happiest where there were loose ropes to play with and Jorja
preferred stable, smooth places where she could be near her mother. (Gibonas, 2016)
These observations were a call to slow down the pace of the work and change the approach. This
meant moving away from thinking about a general solution for the gibbons, and using the single
shared web to create personalised areas for each member in order to respond to their unique
characteristics by reconsidering the importance of the care the zookeepers provide to each gibbon.
The prototyping process becomes what Haraway (2008) describes as an “embodied
communication,” a dance in which the “flow of entangled meaningful bodies in time—whether jerky
and nervous or flaming and flowing, whether both partners move in harmony or painfully out of
synch or something else altogether—is communication about relationship, the relationship itself,
and the means of reshaping relationship and so its enacters.” (Haraway, 2008, p. 26)
The recognition of each gibbon’s uniqueness had an ethical impact on those involved in the
prototyping process. The docent team had to engage in a different dialogue with the Gibonas and
the zookeepers. Instead of requiring specific statements and solutions that could be tested
according to the protocol, they began to seek out ways of creating interspecies dialogue. The
zookeepers also stopped being viewed as technicians and were recognised as true agents and codesigners: the idea of identifying unique areas within a single web was discussed a great deal with
them. It is assumed that the gibbons’ main partners are the zookeepers.
In this way, the docent team began to accept that the Gibonas had to explore the type of
relationships that the prototype revealed and precipitated. As such, the original controversy gave
way to an overhaul of the design method. This experience linked the docent team, zookeepers, ZNdC
scientists and students to a higher level of reflection on the prototyping process.

5

Environmental enrichment as performative activity

A broader ecology of contingent correspondences began to be defined as they moved into the
second prototype, now recognising as its purpose the construction of encounter value (Haraway,
2008) between humans, gibbons and materialities.
This was a point of inflection in the process of understanding environmental enrichment. The
slowdown generated by the first “idiotic” prototyping showed that what enriches the environment
was not necessarily a product designed to solve a need of the users, but the prototyping process
itself and the multiple experiences produced. In other words, enriching the gibbons’ environment no
longer exclusively depended on the design of an artefact and the amenities that it offers, but the
atmospheres, testing experiences and situations that unfolded throughout the prototyping, which
generate “care and longing” (Ingold, 2017) and in which the entities involved in the prototype are
always becoming-with. This inflection in the understanding of the notion of environmental
enrichment also revealed the distinction between the prototype as object and product, and
prototyping as an activity and process (DiSalvo, 2014; Tironi & Hermansen 2018).
Nonetheless, the net used in the second prototype was designed to include areas tailored to the
character and preferences of each gibbon, differentiating the configurations, densities, grip points
and tensions of each sector of the web (see Figure 3). The objective of the second cycle of
prototyping was to consolidate the idea of a shared space while offering differentiated sectors for
unique uses designed based on the preferences manifested by each gibbon. The prototyping
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promoted a process of singularisation, showing how ineffective the references to the generic
gibbons were. As the Gibonas put it, “With this prototype, we are seeking to address the specificities
of each gibbon while maintaining a shared web. We consider the various stages of development,
behaviours and needs, and are looking to increase interactions among them and promote the
development of their unique qualities.” (Gibonas, 2016)

Figure 3: General view of the installation of the second prototype (Gibonas, 2016).

In contrast to the first prototype, which was idiotic in that no questions materialised, the second was
designed to operationalise a clear hypothesis: the gibbon family could have quality time together on
a shared structure in which each family member is located in the visual field of the rest of the group
while each of the structure’s sectors welcomes the preferences of a particular gibbon. To put it
differently, the prototype sought to take up each of the four characters recognised through the
affordances of the object.
While the hypothesis incorporated into this second prototyping cycle pointed to the uniqueness of
the gibbons and was based on original data, its object-oriented character imposed the
predominance of the prototype over the prototyping process. The response of the four users to this
methodological change was immediate: the behaviour of Sanuk, Kayak, Kena and Jorja exceeded the
layout of the device. Once the second version was implemented, the qualities attributed to each
gibbon proved to be circumstantial: their profiles did not match their behaviour. Moreover, instead
of corroborating their uniqueness, the gibbons were mainly gregarious in response to the redesign
of the web. As the zookeepers put it at the end of the first day of implementation, “Seems that
today, they woke up in the mood to enjoy family life.” As a result, the different areas of the web,
each of which was hypothetically compatible with the nature of one of the gibbons, was utilised as a
meeting space, which was not part of the design script.

6

The primacy of the encounter

The next four cycles of prototyping showed that the gibbons gradually naturalised the jute netting. As
Figure 4 shows, the gibbons repeatedly engaged in activities in different parts of their enclosure,
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including the jute artefact. Their knowledge and familiarity with the device translated into less
intensive but quotidian use. Despite the successive attempts by the Gibonas –with the zookeepers and
docents– to establish a dialogue with each of the gibbons through the configuration of differentiated
areas within their design, their modes of use, appropriation and reinterpretation of the device always
called into question the suppositions and hypotheses of the design. As one of the zookeepers put it,
“The gibbons have behaviour patterns, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t get bored after playing
the same way for a certain amount of time. It is just like with people- at first you feel like a kid with a
new toy, but then you get used to it and you use it in whatever way works for you” (Gibonas, 2016).
This made it clear to everyone involved in this experience that the will “to enfold” (Domínguez Rubio
& Fogué, 2014) the needs of the gibbons in an artefact, the students' behaviour in a method, or the
zookeepers’ agency in a technical role, clashed with the recalcitrances of each actor. Instead, the
environmental enrichment occurred as an “event” (Wilkie, 2014), as the result of interspecies
encounters that demonstrated their practical and affective interdependence (Haraway 2008).
Following Judith Butler (2016), this interdependence makes our "precariousness" palpable. For
Butler, "precariousness as a generalized condition relies on a conception of the body as
fundamentally dependent on, and conditioned by, a sustained and sustainable world;
responsiveness—and thus, ultimately, responsibility—is located in the affective responses to a
sustaining and impinging world. Because such affective responses are invariably mediated, they call
upon and enact certain interpretative frames” (Butler, 2016, p. 34).
The interspecies encounter analysed here—especially the experience of the first cycle of
prototyping, in which affective correspondences were protagonists—made it possible for us to
recognise the interdependency and precariousness of the entities that sustained and are sustained
by the ephemeral world precipitated for the prototyping process. This recognition revealed the
conflict between the two frames, namely, the anthropocentric and product-oriented approach
inscribed in the user-centered methodology, and the performatively constituted one that "call into
question the taken-for-granted character" of the first and manages to "provide the affective
conditions for a social critique" (Butler 2016, p. 34-35)—in our case, a critique of the way design
methods subjectify the entities involved.

Figure 4: The prototype naturalised in the enclosure (Gibonas, 2016).
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The Gibonas’ idiotic behaviour in the first prototyping is followed by the gibbons’ ‘misbehaviour’
during the other five prototyping cycles. In other words, the unexpected reactions of the gibbons to
the affordances of the prototypes revealed the resistance that recalcitrance offers to the efforts of
the service or product design of objectifying (Despret, 2008; Stengers, 1997) or framing (Butler, 2016)
the recipient. The recalcitrance of the entities studied that resists what is done to them tends to be
minimised in conventional scientific practice (Despret, 2008). Instead of responding to the inventive
responses that emerge from flare-ups of recalcitrance, researchers often consider these unexpected
answers to their research questions an obstacle to the generation of scientific knowledge.

7

Conclusion. Attentiveness and fiction as modes of knowing

We described how the process of designing an environmental enrichment device for the family of
gibbons at the ZNdC progressively become an ecology of attentiveness and mutual care. The
intervention moved from informed prototype development based on a user-centred and problemsolving logic to an open-ended, experimental prototyping process that was sensitive to the
exploration of interspecies associations. The TDI-UC’s original goal of targeting and shaping the
essential qualities of its recipients in order to define a design opportunity that would sustain a future
product was undone by the prototyping process itself. The alignments and mismatches generated by
prototyping allowed humans and non-humans leave their marks and challenged the programmes
that were imposed on them.
We argue that the capacities deployed in the prototyping cycles allow researchers to test types of
cosmopolitical encounters (Tironi and Harmansen, 2018), exploring ways to joining others in an
ongoing and expeculaive process (Ingold, 2017). The very process of prototyping favours the
recomposition of an interspecies environment, sheltering the delicate unfolding of an “us” based on
the mutual care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017) and longing. This does not mean that we believe that all
prototypes materialise cosmopolitics, but rather that the presence of certain qualities in the
prototyping –fragility and care, recalcitrance and performativity- precipitate mutual interweaving
between human and non-humans. The capacity of prototyping to slow down the processes not only
challenges essentialist normativities, but also invites us to lay bare new forms of species
interdependence, cultivating speculative skills for paying attention and making visible the
precariousness inherent in each entity involved (Butler, 2016: 34-35)
On the other hand, we showed how the performativity of prototyping evokes new valorisations of
animals-as-subjects. When interspecies prototyping occurs, new relationships and environments,
spaces for becoming together and modes of correspondence between ontologies are created. It is
important to underscore how the indocility of students and gibbons was not addressed as an
obstacle, but as an opportunity for testing out new forms of interspecies dialogue. These recalcitrant
situations forced the docent team to question its own capacity to impose a preconceived approach
to the design of a certain world and to consider the complexity of the many modes of existence we
deal with. The reactions of the gibbon family to human plans exemplify the uselessness of projecting
our human image onto other-than-human beings. When confronting the need to learn from nonhumans, prototyping offered us-humans an immersive and relational mode of interspecies
coexistence that is as fragile and precarious as itself. In other words, in this movement towards an
ecological awareness beyond the human or words and anthropology of life (Kohn, 2017), the
experience of interspecies prototyping allows for the emergence of cosmopolitical encounters in
which mismatch, affectivity and care are key aspects. As Haraway says, "It is a question of
cosmopolitics, of learning to be “polite” in responsible relation to always asymmetrical living and
dying, and nurturing and killing.” (2008, p. 42)
Recognising that the zoo as an institution is the epitome of anthropocentrism, materialising the
hegemony of humans (especially that of of white male scientists) in its capacity to maintain a
particular regime of life (Grazian, 2015), we have shown that forms of "species interdependence" did
appeared at certain points in the prototyping process. While working with the openness and fragility
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of prototyping to welcome the coming together of ontological differences, we explore new forms of
intimacy and correspondence between humans and non-humans. The affective experience of
coexistence favoured through prototyping opens-up conditions for social interrogation and a
rethinking of the zoo as well as design and allows for a critique of the “frames” that silently impose
an order, a hierarchy of living bodies, whether human or non-human.
The affective approach bountied through prototyping invites us to deploy forms of attention instead
of intention (Ingold, 2017), making explicit the permanent re-construction of our relationships. The
cosmopolitical form of care performed by the Gibonas when they created an idiotic prototype that
was open to gibbons' curiosity freed them from methodological impositions while opening up new
ways of becoming together for everyone involved. Following Haraway (2008), “caring means
becoming subject to the unsettling obligation of curiosity, which requires knowing more at the end
of the day than at the beginning.” (p. 36)
We believe that it is crucial to insist that prototyping as an event (Wilkie, 2014) or process -not as an
object- makes the ontological differences perceivable and becomes a playground in which to
generate practices of correspondence, mutual attention and care (Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017).
Conceiving of prototyping as a process constituted mainly by situated knowledge entails an
ecological understanding of design (Tironi and Hermansen, 2018): instead of striving to define and
fix the entities included in the design project, we must consider how the set of components
(practices, materials, relationships, living beings, environment, affects, discourses) are co-produced
during prototyping. In other words, rather than thinking in terms of design-object, one must think in
terms of the processes and events in which certain entities are enacted or are rendered possible.
The fragility of prototyping invites us to seriously consider the notion that we cannot take any entity
for granted because these are always re-occurring in an ecology of discontinuities and
correspondences, of frictions and affections.
Finally, we propose that prototyping can be a privileged way of knowing and transforming the world,
to investigating and modifying ecologies as realities in constant evolution, challenging linear ways of
conceiving of the project. We do not aspire to conceive of a method to project global or scalable
solutions, but quite the opposite: interspecies prototyping, always local and located, exceeds plans
and rationalisations. This impels whoever designs and investigates to adjust to the ethics of care that
prototyping enables. It is in this place of cosmopolitan encounters where recalcitrances, failures and
frictions become resources for learning the art of correspondence.
Acknowledgments: We want to thank Vinciane Despret for her comments made to our
work during her visit to Santiago, Chile. The authors would also like to thank the two
reviewers for their helpful and deep comments on an earlier version of this paper. This
article is part of the research project ‘Co-existence and Affectivity between Humans and
Non-Humans: Interactive Traveling Exhibit,’ which benefits from the support of the
Vicerrectoría de Investigación at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
(http://cosmopolitica.cl/ cosmopolitical-design-project/).

8

References

Binder, T., Brandt, E., Ehn, P., & Halse, J. (2015). Democratic design experiments: between parliament and
laboratory. CoDesign, 11(3-4), 152-165.
Bjørgvinsson, E., Ehn, P., & Hillgren, P.-A. (2012). Design Things and Design Thinking: Contemporary
Participatory Design Challenges. Design Issues, 28(3), 101-116. doi:10.1162/DESI_a_00165
Butler, J. (2016). Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? : Verso Books.
Callon, M. (2008). Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From Prosthetic Agencies to
Habilitated Agencies Living in a Material World: Economic Sociology Meets Science and Technology Studies
(pp. 29-56): MIT Press.
Callon, M., & Rip, A. (1992). Humains, non-humains: morale d’une coexistence La Terre Outragée. Les Experts
sont Formel! (pp. 140-156). Paris: Autrement.

483

Calvillo González, N., & Mesa del Castillo Clavel, M. (2018). Tender infrastructures: diseñando con cuidado, o
aportaciones entre los “asuntos de los cuidados” y la arquitectura. Diseña (12), 172-195. Doi:
10.7764/disena.12.172-195
Cordua, C. (2008). Sloterdijk y Heidegger. La recepción filosófica: Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales.
Corsín Jiménez, A. (2013). The prototype: more than many and less than one. Journal of Cultural Economy,
7(4), 381-398.
Corsín Jiménez, A. (2014). The right to infrastructure: a prototype for open source urbanism. ENVIRONMENT
AND PLANNING D SOCIETY AND SPACE, 32, 342-362.
Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (1994). What is Philosophy? : Verso.
De la Cadena, M. (2015). Earth beings: Ecologies of practice across Andean worlds. Duke University Press.
Descola, P. (2005). Par-delà nature et culture. Paris: Gallimard.
Despret, V. (2008). The becomings of subjectivity in animal worlds. Subjectivity, 23, 123–139.
Despret, V. (2004). The body we care for: Figures of anthropo-zoo-genesis. Body & Society, 10(2-3), 111-134.
DiSalvo, C. (2014). Critical Making as Materializing the Politics of Design. The Information Society, 30(2), 96105. doi:10.1080/01972243.2014.875770
Domínguez Rubio, F., & Fogué, U. (2014). Unfolding the political capacities of design What is Cosmopolitical
Design? Design, Nature and the Built Environment. Londres: Ashgate.
Gibonas, L. (2016). Bitácora Dispositivo Enriquecimiento Ambiental para Gibones. Retrieved from
http://familiagibon.blogspot.cl/
Grazian, D. (2015). American Zoo: A Sociological Safari. Princeton University Press.
Haraway, D. (2008). When Species Meet. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
Habermas, J. (1991) The structural transformation of the public sphere: an inquiry into a category of bourgeois
society. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hermansen, P., & Tironi, M. (2018). Pedagogical impugnation: Interspecies prototyping and cosmopolitical
encounters. Diseña, (12), 196-227.
Ingold, T. (1988). The Animal in the Study of Humanity. In T. Ingold (Ed.), What is an Animal? (pp. 84-99).
London: Routledge.
Ingold, T. (2013). Making: Anthropology, Archaeology, Art and Architecture: Taylor & Francis.
Ingold, T. (2017). On human correspondence. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 23(1), 9-27.
doi:10.1111/1467-9655.12541
Jönsson, L., & Lenskjold, T. (2017). Speculative prototypes and alien ethnographies: Experimenting with
relations beyond human. Diseña(11).
Jönsson, L. (2014). DESIGN EVENTS: On explorations of a non-anthropocentric framework in design. (PhD), The
Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, Denmark. Retrieved from https://kuldoc.com/download/designevents-on-explorations-of-a-non-anthropocentric-framework-in-design-_597a0dc21723dd39407d0006_pdf
Jönsson, L., & Lenskjold, T. U. (2014). A foray into not-quite companion species: Design experiments with
urban-animals as significant others. Artifact, 3(2), 7-1.
Kelley, T. (2007). The Art of Innovation: Lessons in Creativity from IDEO, America's Leading Design Firm: Crown
Publishing Group.
Kirksey, S. E., & Helmreich, S. (2010). The Emergence of Multispecies Ethnographers. Cultural Anthopology,
25(4), 545-576. doi:10.1111/j.1548-1360.2010.01069.x
Kohn, E. (2007). How Dogs Dream: Amazonian Natures and the Politics of Transspecies Engagement. American
Ethnologist, 34(1), 3-24.
Latour, B. (2005). From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik or How to Make Things Public. In B. Latour & P. Weibel (Eds.),
Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (pp. 1072). Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Latour, B. (2007). Quel cosmos? Quelles cosmopolitiques? L’émergence des cosmopolitiques (pp. 62-82). Paris:
La Découverte.
Latour, B. (2008). A Cautious Prometheus? A Few Steps Toward a Philosophy of Design (with Special Attention
to Peter Sloterdijk). Paper presented at the Design History Society Falmouth, Cornwall. http://www.brunolatour.fr/sites/default/files/112-DESIGN-CORNWALL-GB.pdf
Lestel, D. (2004). L'animal singulier. Paris: Seuil.
Lury, Celia (forthcoming). Preface. In C. Lury et al. (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Interdisciplinary Research
Methods. London: Routledge (author´s version).
Martin, R. (2009). The Design of Business: Why Design Thinking is the Next Competitive Advantage: Harvard
Business Review Press.
Maze, R. (2016). Design and the Future Temporal politics of ‘making a difference' (pp. 37-54): Bloomsbury
Publishing.

484

Michael, M. (2012). De-signing the object of sociology: toward an idiotic methodology. The Sociological
Review, 60(S1), 166-183.
Rice, L. (2017). Nonhumans in participatory design. CoDesign: International Journal of CoCreation in Design and
the Arts.
Stengers, I. (1997). Power and Invention. Situating Science (Vol. 10). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press.
Stengers, I. (2005). The Cosmopolitical Proposal. In B. Latour & P. Weibel (Eds.), Making Things Public:
Atmospheres of Democracy (pp. 1072). MIT Press: ZKM/Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe.
Stengers, I. (2010). Including Nonhumans in Political Theory: Opening Pandora's Box? In B. Braun & S. J.
Whatmore (Eds.), Political Matter. Technoscience, Democracy, and Public Life (pp. 3-33). Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Stengers, I. (2013). Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices. Cultural Studies Review, 11(1), 183-196.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/csr.v11i1.3459
Tironi, M., & Hermansen, P. (2018). Cosmopolitical encounters: Prototyping at the National Zoo in Santiago,
Chile. Journal of Cultural Economy, 1-18.
Tironi, M., Hermansen, P., & Neira, J. (2014). El prototipo como dispositivo cosmopolítico: Etnografía de
prácticas de diseño en el Zoológico Nacional de Chile. Pléyade(14), 61-95.
Tsing, A. (2010). Arts of Inclusion, or How to Love a Mushroom. Manoa 22, no. 2: 191–203.
Wilkie, A. (2014). Prototyping as Event: Designing the Future of Obesity. Journal of Cultural Economy, 7(4), 476492. doi:10.1080/17530350.2013.859631
Wilkie, A., Savransky, M., & Rosengarten, M. (2017). Speculative Research. The Lure of Possible Futures.
London: Routledge.

About the Authors:
Martin Tironi: Sociologist, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC). Master in
Sociology, Université Paris-Sorbonne V. PhD and Post-Doctorate, Center for
Sociology of Innovation, Ecole des Mines de Paris. Researcher and Professor, School
of Design PUC. He is currently Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Invention and Social
Process at Goldsmiths.
Pablo Hermansen Designer and Doctor in Architecture and Urban Studies,
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (PUC). Teacher and researcher at the PUC
School of Design. He works on the role of photography in qualitative research and
explores cosmopolitical prototyping and action research for public health.

485

